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Abstract Relating the concept of power to motives and objectives for criminal
activities results in different images of criminals and their motivations. In this article,
we aim to reflect on two different forms of crime (burglary versus money
laundering) starting from a power perspective. We describe how the pursuit of
power may or may not be related to crime, perpetrators and the policies that have
been developed to prevent or repress these types of crime. By examining the motives
behind both burglary and money laundering, we try to make clear how the concept
of power and power pursuit leads to different rationales in criminal conduct. We try
to determine to what extent ‘rational choice’ plays a role in this respect. As a
conclusion, we argue that ‘power’ as such influences patterns of crime, victimisation
and societal reactions (by means of criminal policy). The extent to which power
accumulation is an outcome of crime, will in part determine the social reaction to
crime and as a result, the perceived threat of crime.
In a recent article, Ruggiero ([20]:165) describes the concept of ‘power crime’ as
crime committed by states, companies, financial institutions and other powerful
organisations. “Perpetrators of power crime are offenders who possess an
exorbitantly exceeding amount of material and symbolic resources when compared
to those possessed by their victims. Power crime should be located against the
background of differentiated opportunities which are offered to social groups. Social
inequalities determine varied degrees of freedom whereby individuals are granted a
specific number of choices and a specific range of potential actions they can carry
out. (..)The greater the degree of freedom enjoyed, the wider the range of choices
available”.
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In this contribution, we intend to apply this concept of power to two specific
forms of crime and the social reaction to these crimes. With this objective, money
laundering—as economic crime—and burglary—as property crime—and their
relation to power and power acquisition will be discussed. These crimes are dissimilar
in several respects: motives, perpetrators, risks, victimisation and approach. The aim
of studying these dissimilarities is to assess to what extent motives, desires and reasons
differ when applied to different forms of crime and the concept of power. In other
words, our aim is to map the motives for both forms of crime in order to reflect on the
extent to which committing crime is a means of striving for (more) power and gaining
influence. Associated with this reflection is the choice that policy makers have made in
relation to the approach to these different types of crime. How does the choice by
policy makers relate to the ‘power’ motive in the crime considered? We reflect on
these questions starting from the premise that crimes generating economic power will
be approached differently on the (inter)national policy level than crimes that can be
considered as part of a ‘survival economy’.
Power?
First, we need to define what ‘power’ actually means in this regard.
Power can be exercised in several ways. Weber defined power as “the probability
that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own
will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” [8]. In
short, the ability to make use of power will lead to an increase in the probability that
an individual will be in a position to exert his own will, without taking into account
the choices of others. This means that power can only exist within relationships, in
interactions with others over whom power is exerted. Without these relationships or
interactions, power is insignificant. In other words, it concerns the ability of a person
to control or influence the choices of other persons. From this point of view, power
is a central notion in the specific description of social relations.
Sometimes social relations can be understood in terms of dominance and
subordination, and this is when the notion of power becomes significant. Even
Robinson Crusoe needed Man Friday Offterdinger to dominate his island. Not all
relationships, however, entail the exercise of power. Relatively (un-)equal relation-
ships may be based on constraint. We speak of power when differences among actors
are substantial and blatant, obvious and unilateral. Otherwise, all relationships could
be understood in terms of power, and its meaning would be lost.
Moreover, power is a relative, dynamic notion. From a structuralist point of view,
the actor who achieves a certain amount of power will strive for more. The notion of
power refers, in other words, to a personal ongoing inclination towards growing
dominance. Rational choice theory is increasingly used in criminology and other
disciplines to analyse power relationships [7]. According to this theory, individuals
can be seen as actors who select particular options from within a set of choices in
order to try and achieve more power. This entails that power is, for certain people, an
entity that organises their choices, whilst for others it remains an irrelevant entity
Some make ‘rational’ (read: power) choices, others do not.
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Power can take several shapes. Wright Mills [30] described the power elite as a
small group of people who possess a disproportionate amount of wealth, privilege,
and decision-making capacity. He focused on the relationship between the political,
military and economic elite, noting that people constituting such elite share common
world views. The use of power does not involve by necessity coercion or violence
(force); it can also involve influence. Power can be considered as legitimate, mostly
denoted by the notion of authority (political power), but it can also be regarded as
evil, unjust or even illegal, and thus illegitimate. In this contribution, we are
interested in forms of economic power, with a special criminological focus on the
borderline between legal and illegal power.
As previously mentioned, a specific characteristic inherent to power is the fact
that its expansion only takes place at the expense of others. This is also the case with
economic power. A powerful actor can take options away from another’s choice set,
can change the relative costs of actions, can change the likelihood that a given action
will lead to a given outcome, etc.
Money laundering as well as burglary can both lead to a rise in economic power,
but in different fashions. The money launderer can gain economic power by taking
up a position in the legal market, based on illegitimately-acquired finances. Money
laundering will result in an increase in power in the legal sphere, while burglary in
itself may only result in a higher income in the illegal sphere. This difference
between the exercise of power in parallel but inherently distinct spheres is crucial in
our reflection.
Motives
Money laundering
Is money laundering power crime? We suggest it is: money laundering, or the
“process in which assets obtained or generated by criminal activity are moved or
concealed to obscure their link with the crime” [10], is inherently linked to the
gaining of economic power. Money laundering takes place on the threshold between
the illegal and the legal economy. There are two dimensions of power related to this
crime. To begin with, in order to speak of money laundering, the money needs to be
‘earned’ in the illegal economy by means of criminal acts, which often implies the
use of violence or pressure in an illegal sense by which power is acquired. This
power is subsequently transformed into ‘legal’ power by converting the money from
illegal into seemingly legal revenues. By lifting the money over the border between
the illegal and the legal, a new type of power is created: the ability to make (lawful)
use of the acquired money in the world of legal corporations, investments and
opportunities. This implies a rise in possibilities and as a result more potential to
gain influence in the legal world. As long as criminal entrepreneurs are operating
solely in the underground economy, their ability to operate on the legal market is
hampered by the illegal source of their revenues. However, the moment they are able
to launder these illegal revenues (thereby transforming illegal into legal funds), they
will be able to utilise these funds in the legal economy, which implies the
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accumulation of economic power in two senses. Not only will this result in a growth
in economic influence, but also in a strengthened position on the legal market. The
legal market also allows for the use of legal mechanisms, available in that market.
While operating in the underground economy, these mechanisms remain beyond the
reach of criminal entrepreneurs, who will have to resort to other strategies,
procedures and instruments, for example, illegal violence. After having successfully
entered the legal economy, the state apparatus provides the means to exert and
accumulate power in a legitimate way.
Burglary
Burglary, on the other hand, is a crime aimed at making money in a survival
economy; burglars state that the reasons why they steal vary from either ‘to survive,
to live, to live a more luxury life’, or to ‘pay for my addiction’. Young burglars also
remark that they get a kick out of a burglary, that a successful burglary results in a
rush of adrenaline. The power motive is not present in the discourse of burglars:
burglary is a ‘job’, something you do for a living [28]. The ability to enhance
legitimate power through burglary is quasi absent, as these perpetrators predomi-
nantly remain in the illegal sphere. The ultimate dream of the burglar seems to be to
succeed in a kind of treasure-hunt, in the ‘jackpot’, the unattended tremendous
‘score’. But... every burglar knows that this happens extremely rarely, or perhaps
never. There is no calculus, no power-plan, in the long-run of a career as a burglar.
Profits
The profits in money laundering
The question is to what extent gaining power in the economic sphere is actually a
specific goal of money laundering? We turn to the literature for some answers. The
US Department of State identified the power-motive of money laundering in the
following terms: “Money laundering is now being viewed as a central dilemma in
dealing with all forms of international organized crime because financial gain
means power” [23]. This rationalisation was one of the motivations to start the battle
against money laundering in the 80’s: the fear of policy makers about a growing
criminal power group in the legal economy, with far-reaching influence on formal
corporations and politics. In other words, what was feared was the criminalisation of
the legal economic activities [17]. Although there is much debate about the reality of
these fears, Naylor states that they have never been proven to be true or realistic.
According to Masciandaro, the economic function of money laundering can be
found in the transformation of potential to effective purchasing power [16]. As the
revenues of underlying criminal activities cannot be employed directly in the legal
sphere for consumption, investments or savings, the origins of these revenues need
to be disguised. It is precisely this transformation into effective purchasing power
that leads to an augmentation of lawful economic power. This does not imply that all
proceeds of crime are laundered; on the contrary, only a part of criminally earned
money will be laundered for use in the legal economy, namely those parts of the
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proceeds of crime that perpetrators wish to invest or save [14]. In several cases,
much of the criminal revenues will be spent “on the fast life, on cars, boats and
home improvements, or kept in cash form or jewellery and other ‘movables’ which
can readily be transported overseas and is not bulky” [14]. The analysis of several
court cases on money laundering and civil forfeiture proceedings reveals that, along
with the opening of foreign bank accounts and the purchase of art works and
antiques, expensive lifestyles are the major ways of disposing of criminal proceeds.
Defendants allegedly spend their money on fur coats, hotel bills, holidays or
expensive clothing [11]. These cases show that criminal entrepreneurs are not only
driven by an irrational impetus to achieve power, but also by the desire to display
that power in the form of status. The will to stand out and the desire to show strength
are part of the incentive.
This implies that the money that actually will be laundered is money that is
required to be used in a formal way, such as “savings from crime, transfers of
payment for criminal purchases, and deposits of savings from crime committed
overseas” [14]. Persons who engage in money laundering do this to avoid
punishment and to be able to benefit from their profits through investments and
consumptions in the legal economy [21; 15]. Naylor agrees on this point, adding that
the reasons behind money laundering may either be the pursuit of security on a
longer term basis (including the wish to leave wealth to one’s heirs), or the will to
apply criminal methods to legal businesses in order to make even more profit [17].
The latter is an ‘emergency scenario’ [17], as this would imply increasing power
through legal instruments, but knowledge of how this scenario is realistic is limited
due to lack of empirical evidence. Several authors warn of the stimulating effect that
money laundering may have on crime: the rise in economic power makes crime
more worthwhile [24], or in other words, it makes sure that crime does pay. The
legal status of financial means also makes it possible for launderers to act as
investors and buyers on the formal market, which may enhance criminal activities.
Suendorf, who studied several cases of money laundering, states that the profit
motive is not the only reason for entrance into the legal economy. Illegal operations
and the development of professional forms of money laundering are made possible
thanks to the availability of legal corporations, some of which can also guarantee
high living standards to launderers or even spurious forms of retirement funds.
Rarely do such investments completely lack illegal objectives, or simply aim for
integration into the legal sphere [22]. In other words, money laundering is not only
an expression of a never-ending desire for power and influence, but is also a means
to feel ‘safe’ or comfortable. To summarise: by laundering criminal proceeds,
launderers secure their illegal businesses on the one hand, and their personal future
on the other. Money laundering acts, therefore, as an insurance policy.
The profits in burglary
After a burglary, the goods taken will be sold as soon as possible. The revenues of
stolen goods will be used in a variety of ways linked to the motives of the burglar:
purchasing drugs, buying food and drinks, or spending the profits on cars, mobile
phones, expensive clothes. Some burglars state that they hide the money in order to
build up a reserve for the future [28]. Here, we see something familiar: criminal
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funds provide a form of insurance. However, the intertwining with the legal world of
businesses and corporations is completely absent in the use of the profits from
burglary. Burglars do not aim for a place in the legal economy nor do they want to
build an ‘empire’ by perpetuating their crime. On the contrary, they hope to
consolidate their place in illegality: it is exactly this illegal sphere that allows for the
continuation of their activities.
Costs
Alongside the advantages of money laundering, there are also some negative
aspects: the laundering in itself is a costly method—the cost of money laundering is
estimated at around 50% of the amount of money that is to be laundered [24].
Operations may take time, as sometimes complex procedures are put in place and, at
each stage of the money laundering process, there is a risk of detection. Furthermore,
as soon as the money is successfully laundered, taxes need to be paid. Taking these
side-effects into account, van Duyne concludes that money laundering ‘is only
applied when needed’ [25]. His observation is based on the fact that laundering, on
the one hand, requires certain skills which are not always available, and on the other
hand, it is both risky and costly. Therefore, people will only choose to launder their
proceeds when all other options are unavailable. Taking all these negative aspects
into consideration, why would people choose to launder their illegal proceeds? At
which point is money laundering ‘needed’?
When focusing on the aspect of economic power, generated by money laundering,
and not on the specific financial function of money laundering itself (i.e. the need for
formal revenues), we may hypothesise that money laundering is not only carried out
because it is ‘needed’ but also because it generates legitimate power and influence.
We would argue that there is not only a need to launder money, but there is also a
will. We shall now provide some examples to illustrate our point. The differentiation
between the quest for economic power and the need for formal financial means may
be linked to the specific crime committed, prior to the money laundering phase.
From the perspective of a drug dealing business, money laundering may not
specifically be ‘needed’ for the continuation of the business. Drug dealers,
historically seen as the main agents of money laundering, may not always have an
advantage in laundering their revenues. In considering that drug-related crimes are
not the only crimes leading to money laundering, we will now look at other illegal
activities. Looking at other types of crime that lead to the laundering of money may
help us find some insights on additional motives for the use of money laundering as
a tool in itself.
Analysing the data from the Belgian FIU annual report1 we see that drug crimes
only represented 12% of the cases reported to the public prosecutor’s office in 2007.
Swindling and illegal trade in goods represented respectively 15 and 14%.
Moreover, serious and organised fiscal fraud (mainly VAT carrousel-fraud), crimes
1 Taking into account the fact that these are cases that are actually reported to the FIU, which implies that
this represents a specific group of money launderers—the ones that are caught laundering.
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related to bankruptcy and abuse of company assets, taken together represented
almost 23% of all offences reported to the public prosecution (Fig. 1).
This difference in crime rates may be due to the expertise that is needed for
money laundering. Several criminals (such as drug traffickers or human traffickers)
have to rely on financial experts to get their money laundered, while professional
fraudsters are self-sufficient and skilled enough to perform their own money
laundering activities [18]. Another explanation may be that the latter probably have
legitimate financial instruments at their disposal, unlike drug dealers who mainly
work in a cash-economy. We may assume that the costs of laundering money will
therefore be higher for those lacking expertise and professional instruments.
This may shed some light on the viability or otherwise of money laundering. The
need or the will to launder money may become more imperative when revenues
originate from specific forms of crime, committed by specific perpetrators endowed
with specific skills. Hypothetically, this would suggest that money laundering occurs
when all other possibilities for increasing power in the illegal economy are
exhausted—which implies that in order to expand power, activities need to be
shifted into the legal sphere. The search for growth potential and the drive for more
power are more than just a survival strategy, which is the strategy we see in the
burglar’s motives.
In burglary, this cost-calculation is of minor importance, as the motives for
burglary are inherently different. While money laundering is a means to increase
potential for further power acquisition (an investment for the future), burglary in
general does not result in more possibilities for future criminal activities. Selling the
stolen goods deriving from a burglary is an investment in personal needs, not in
future positions or chances. Here the power motive emerges.
Power as a motive?
Some specific types of crime that precede money laundering may well be inherently
linked to the pursuit of power and influence in the legal economy. After all,
criminals can also choose to remain in the illegal economy, thus avoiding the risks
and costs incurred when entering the formal economy. The quest for economic
Fig. 1 Predicate crimes for money laundering. CTIF-CFI Annual Report 2007 [1]
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power and influence in the formal sphere may be more typical of crimes such as
fiscal fraud or swindling than of drug-related crimes or prostitution. The ability to
make use of both the legal and illegal economy, combined with the intertwining of
legal and illegal activities, provides the ‘business criminal’ with benefits transcending
the mere benefits generated by illegal actions.
Dutch empirical research has shown that organised criminals are not as interested
in the domination of the economic and political arena as has long been assumed.
“Most criminals are not interested in generating economic and political power in the
Netherlands. They fancy a certain life style and are somewhat ‘addicted’ to the
luxury that comes with it. They like to live on the edge, but they are not particularly
interested in becoming a relevant economic or political factor” [18]. The Dutch
‘organised crime monitor’ points out that organised crime perpetrators make use of
existing flows of goods and money, but do not control or aim to control
infrastructures, for example, in the transport or financial sectors. They do, however,
use these sectors to commit crimes and to invest dirty money [12]. However, there
are controversial views on this point: some authors explicitly warn about the
infiltration of organised crime in the legal economic or political spheres [29]. As the
researchers of the organised crime monitor observe, this situation is different in
countries as the US or Italy, where such infiltration has been documented [12].
Van Duyne states, in this respect, that it is not organised crime as such, but
‘organised business criminals’ that are most successful in investing their crime
money in the upper world economy [26]. They are able to invest their illegally
earned money in their own enterprises, which results in an increased potential for
gaining economic power and influence. This observation leads us to the assumption
that gaining power in the illegal economy and transforming this power to enhance
one’s economic position in the legal economy (by making use of money laundering)
could be a feature of a specific category of crime and criminals.
Money laundering is a crime which is inherently linked to a previously committed
criminal act. Money laundering in itself is considered to be a variant of receiving
stolen goods. Burglary, on the other hand, can be one of the crimes that lead to the
handling or receiving of stolen goods. However, as is the case in money laundering,
the launderer himself is often engaged in the predicate crime and is trying to conceal
the origins of his revenues.
This is not the case for the handling of stolen goods resulting from burglary. The
burglar may choose to have his earnings sold by a third party, which implies there is
no extra profit for the burglar in the selling of his illegally earned goods. Burglars
actually state that, although selling stolen goods is not very difficult, they are aware
of the fact that the prices they get as providers of stolen goods are much lower than
the prices for which the goods are resold on the market. They state that they are
powerless to influence these practices, as they cannot control the market of stolen
goods, as only the dealers can [28]. Furthermore, it has to be observed that the stolen
goods can only be sold on the illegal market.
In the case of money laundering, however, the launderer maximises the returns of
his illegally yielded income by controlling the revenues from the origins—in the
illegal economy—until the final stage, when the funds have been inserted into the
legal economy.
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The business criminal and money laundering
Adopting the concept of power crime, we established earlier that money laundering
is a crime that produces power. Laundering illegal proceeds of criminal activities
allows for integration in the formal economy, which leads to an increase in economic
power, but also to a feeling of comfort and security through the disguising of the
criminal origins of wealth. By laundering illegal funds, criminal entrepreneurs
become real players in the formal economy, which enhances their opportunities for
cooperation and partnership in the world of legitimate business. In the specialist
literature we find little information on the consequences of money laundering in
relation to the power position of criminal groups [18]. Some examples, however, are
found of legitimate groups that try to strengthen their position through money
laundering. In these cases, we actually speak of organisational crime rather than of
organised crime.
Take, for example, the Lernout & Hauspie (L&H) case that received a great deal
of attention in the Belgian press during the past year. L&H is a Belgian company,
providing speech-processing technology services. L&H developed their market
position and, by December 1999 their annual turnover added up to 212 million
dollars; they employed almost 2,000 people and were represented in 40 different
countries [2]. The company was applauded and praised for its entrepreneurship until,
in September 2001, the Wall Street Journal published an article in which it was
announced that the SEC (Securities Exchange Commission) had launched an
investigation against it. This announcement resulted in a massive sale of L&H stocks
and finally marked the decline of the company, which was accused of fraudulent
bookkeeping and false sales figures. After the first media impact in 2000, the year in
which L&H was dismantled, the second flow of media attention came when the
court hearings for this case started in 2007 and official claims were made against
L&H for swindling, fraudulent accounting, market manipulation, and abuse of
company assets, but also for money laundering [3]. L&H allegedly used front men and
front companies in order to be able to manipulate their accounts and to cover their
losses. Falsified accounts generated high stock prices, and after the discovery of the
fraudulent manipulations, huge debts were uncovered [27], which ultimately
victimised a large number of parties. As the trial started, hundreds of people brought
civil actions against L&H [4], including Dexia Bank and KPMG [5] who are on trial
themselves. Dexia even started a website, claiming their innocence in the L&H case
(http://www.dexia.be/lhsp). This type of crime symbolises the use of money
laundering methods within formal economic spheres, methods which are not aimed
at accessing the legal economy, nor at the ‘washing’ of illegally earned money, but
mainly at the maintenance and expansion of economic power within the formal
economy itself. L&H used front companies to keep up the appearance of a highly
successful company, thus making their revenues seem higher than they were in reality.
These front companies made artificial profits that were registered as real ones, but
were also used as a framework to launder company assets [27].
Another example is the famous BCCI-case (Bank of Credit and Commerce
International) that caused an uproar in the 80s. In this case, the bank was actively
involved in money laundering schemes. The BCCI admitted facilitating (among
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other things) money laundering, bribery and tax fraud, and was found guilty of
several criminal offences. The role of the BCCI bank was proactive; the financial
institution assisted the disguising of criminal revenues, enabling criminal clients to
accumulate economic power, and reinforcing their own power in the process. Passas
& Groskin summarize in the following way the function of institutional support in
money laundering: “The more powerful the actors who employ the services of
international financial institutions, the greater is the institutions’ ability to court
attention, purchase influence and outspend control agencies” [19].
Different risks?
In this section, we aim to clarify the different attitudes towards distinct types of
crime. Perhaps attitudes vary depending of the extent of the perceived ‘risk’ attached
to specific crimes. Moreover, different attitudes and approaches may also depend on
the amount of risk that criminals themselves (be they burglars or money launderers)
encounter in their activity. Do criminals calculate these risks differently? Which
choices are made? And can we actually speak of ‘choices’ in this respect?
Prevention of crime
The battle against money laundering has grown into a massive, international
operation. Since the early 90s, diverse companies, organisations, judicial and police
agencies have been united in an anti money laundering crusade, which takes place
on several levels. Such a crusade is only possible when all involved parties work
together to prevent money laundering. The cooperation of private entities, such as
banks, is crucial in this respect, but the international dimension, inherent to money
laundering, also implies a worldwide approach to this phenomenon. Today, the battle
against money laundering can be described as an intrusive and megalomaniac
project, encompassing public and private services all over the world. We may ask
ourselves the following question: to what extent is the size of this anti money
laundering machine linked to the motives behind money laundering itself? Does the
power motive play a role?
The battle against money laundering is to a large extent based on the work of a
system of informants and whistle-blowers who are obliged to inform the authorities
when they suspect their clients of attempting unorthodox financial operations. This
kind of worldwide and rather intrusive approach is hard to imagine in relation to
other crimes. Applied to burglary, this approach would mean the introduction of a
system in which insurance companies are obliged to make risk assessments of
clients’ assets, which would imply that stolen goods, if found in the assets of clients,
would have to be seized. Similarly, it would mean the introduction of a whistle-
blowing system for dealers in second-hand goods which obliged them to identify,
register and know all customers and suppliers, and keep track of all transactions.
This system would be combined with a thorough enforcement policy. On the other
hand, enforcement in this area appears to be needed, as the most popular targets for
burglars, apart from money, are gold and jewellery. This implies that there is a
market for these goods. This market revolves around pawnbrokers and jewellers,
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although the latter are formally obliged to identify sellers of gold [28]. And why stop
at the dealers? Why not impose obligations on all parties involved? In brief, it would
seem that the severity of social reaction to crime depends on the interests at stake
and on the type of actors victimised.
Of course, the impact of money laundering principally falls upon the state
apparatus. The state being the main victim, it is then easy to claim that the ‘general
interest’ is at stake simultaneously. In contrast, burglary will have a marginal impact
on the state’s interests, as victimisation takes place on an individual level and
endangers mostly ‘personal interests’.
Apart from the different intensity of social reaction, there are also some
similarities between the approach to money laundering and that to burglary: the
battle against money laundering is a costly but also entrepreneurial tactic, in which
both public and private partners protect their own interests. This ‘threat assessment
industry’ [25] thrives on an image of organised crime that menaces the political and
economic interests worldwide. The fear of money laundering becomes an instrument
and a convenient support for the involved parties, who all benefit, in one way or
another, from the battle against money laundering. The same can be said about the
insurance philosophy with regard to burglary. The fear of burglary is also used as a
means for selling more and more insurance policies for the benefit not only of the
insurance companies, but also of other organisations working on theft prevention
(security consultants, private surveillance, CCTV systems, etc.). Both industries take
advantage from the spreading of images of fear and distress and from supposed risks
run by customers. Although founded on diverse calculations of risks, these industries
capitalise on the creation of images as well as on the demand for protection.
Cost-benefit analysis
When devising anti money laundering strategies, policy makers assume that money
launderers are rational individuals making well-pondered choices on the basis of a
cost-benefit assessment. Such an assumption implies that a ‘follow the money’
strategy would scare perpetrators off, as the costs would be higher than the benefits.
Broadening the possibilities for confiscating and seizing proceeds of crime is meant
to deter potential money launderers and hit them where it hurts most: in their wallets
[18]. The philosophy, if any, behind this system is based on the proverbial adage
‘crime should not pay’.
If we assume that a cost-benefit approach underpins the ‘(power) choice’ to
commit crime, this strategy makes sense. However, its effectiveness has been
questioned many times in that criminals are not economists, and criminal motivation
is not determined by calculations of costs and benefits [17]. The system is based on
the assumption that perpetrators by nature strive for wealth. However, as we
suggested earlier, an experienced criminal group will take the confiscation risk for
granted, as ‘the cost of doing business’ [18]. There are other risks involved in the
attempt to launder money than just the risk of confiscation or seizure. The preventive
system surrounding money laundering may unmask fraudsters or money launderers
at the moment when they are preparing to enter the legal market or to improve their
position on the legal market. When caught, the criminal background of the funds will
be revealed (as happened in the BCCI case), which can cause severe reputational
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damage. For legal entities involved in the money laundering scheme, this may even
lead to larger damages, as there is not only a reputational risk involved, but also a
regulatory risk: the regulator may impose significant fines or even withdraw the
business licence. In order to avoid these risks, money launderers may choose to
make use of front men or front companies, who will function as a shield for
reputational damage and exposure. Front companies are also useful in making
transactions even more obscure, and are mostly used for serious or organised fraud
or the abuse of company assets [1].
In respect of burglary, this cost-benefit approach is even more inappropriate: the
choice burglars will make is not per se rational: on the contrary, burglars’ actions are
rather unpredictable [28]. The current approach to prevent burglary is mainly a
situational preventive method in which target hardening, security systems and
technical appliances are predominant, and ignores the non-rational components of
human behaviour [28]. The rational (power) choice assumption is therefore, neither
for burglary nor for money laundering, a perfect preventive method. Moreover, the
motives of both need to be studied thoroughly if we are to develop strategies that fit
the crimes.
To conclude
Is it only since money laundering has become an international phenomenon that the
strategies to tackle it have grown into a global control system? Does money
laundering threaten our economy, our politics and our lives more than burglary?
Assuming that money laundering may lead to the criminal infiltration of the political
and economic spheres, and that this may result in criminals gaining legitimate
power, we may argue that the battle against this type of crime needs to be thorough
and wide ranging. However, there is a lack of evidence that this is precisely the
objective of money launderers. The threat seems, therefore, to be exaggerated.
One of the explanations for the growth of such a global control system may reside
in the power motive behind money laundering. When criminal activity results in
increasing power accumulation, it may be perceived as particularly threatening,
hence the urgent need to prevent it and control its effects.
When we look at aspects of victimisation of burglary and money laundering,
particularly at the interests that they respectively threaten, we see a different picture.
We might underline that the amounts of money transferred and handled is much
higher in money laundering than it is in burglary. However, we lack the statistics to
prove this. When we try to assess which people or institutions are actually
victimised, another remark could be made. Policymakers convince us of the fact that
money laundering harms society as a whole, by threatening the economy and the
‘healthy’ political and economic climate in a country [13]. What is often forgotten,
however, is that money laundering is also functional; it forms a bridge between the
legal and the illegal market, not only for drugs dealers, as is assumed, but for all
sorts of entrepreneurs in criminal activities [9]. This results in a market in which
several illegal, informal and formal entrepreneurs function in their own way and with
their own economic objectives. This market is not only highly diverse, but also
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difficult to tackle, specifically when policy remains focused on the traditional view
of the money launderer.
The intertwining of several markets is also present within the market of burglary
and the subsequent trade in stolen goods. Although burglars themselves mainly
function within the illegal economy, the suppliers and the buyer of stolen goods may
function within formal economic spheres. However, the aim of these transactions are
limited to making a living, to survive, not to gain economic power in a more broad
sense. The power motive differentiates money laundering from burglary also in the
sense that the power gained through entering the official economy provides money
launderers with a competitive advantage on other official operators. Although the
focus of policy makers and legislators remains mainly oriented towards organised
criminals infiltrating the legal world, we may need to fear the ‘business criminal’
more.
We have attempted to make clear that different motives related to either money
laundering or burglary result in different societal reactions, but also require a
different approach toward the criminal groups involved. The drive for power is
crucial within money laundering. Laundering is not performed to survive, which on
the contrary inspires burglars; money launderers aim at enhancing and consolidating
their position in the legal economy. They do not necessarily want to become rich (or
richer) but to develop and build their power position.
We cannot illustrate this never-ending pursuit of power more cogently than by
referring to the title of a newspaper article published in May 2008: “Most wealthy
Belgian is suspected of money laundering” [6].
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